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DEREGULATORY ILLUSIONS AND

BROADCASTING: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT'S ENDURING
FORKED TONGUE
DONALD E. LIVELYt

In 1987 the Federal Communications Commission abandoned the
fairness doctrine which subjected radio and TV to a unique system of
content control The doctrine, and the Supreme Court'sendorsement of

it, typified the second class constitutionalcitizenship of broadcasters.
In this Article Professor Lively criticizes the individualized approach to media regulation represented by the fairness doctrine. He argues that a "uniform" and "strict" approach to official intrusion upon
editorialfreedom is an absolute requirementof any sensiblefirst amendmentjurisprudence. The demise of thefairness doctrine,Lively observes

is merely one step toward the necessary goal of according broadcasters
the same first amendment guaranteesas printjournalists.
The first amendment, although crafted in absolute terms,1 has begotten divergent standards for different sectors of the press. Generally the United States
Supreme Court has been vigilant toward official efforts to control the influence
or impair the editorial autonomy of publishers. 2 The Court has observed, however, that "broad statements of principle... are sometimes qualified by contrary
decisions before the absolute limit of the stated principle is reached."'3 It thus
has been more inclined to balance regulatory concerns against the editorial freedom of newer nonprint media 4 and thereby brook governmental interference
with them.5 Consistent with such analytical malleability and disparity, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently pronounced that broadcasters should have the same first amendment status as publishers, 6 but that special
governance of indecent or offensive programming is not incongruent with such
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo. A.B. 1969, University of California,
Berkeley; M.S. 1970, Northwestern; J.D. 1979, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. The first amendment's guarantee against "law[s]... abridging freedom ... of the press,"
U.S. CONST. amend. I, has an absolute cast to it. Many other fundamental constitutional guarantees
are less precise in their wording. See, eg., id. amend. IV (protection against unreasonable search);
amend. VI (right to impartial jury and assistance of counsel); amend. VIII (guarantee against excessive bail and cruel punishment); amend. XIV, § 2 (privileges and immunities, due process, and equal
protection clauses).
2. See, eg., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
3. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 65-66 (1976).
4. For purposes of this article "new media" include cable, television, radio, and film. These
media, unlike the older print media, do not rely exclusively or primarily upon the written word.
5. See infra notes 42-46, 63-64, 71-75 and accompanying text.
6. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 5043, 5055-57 (1987); infra notes 18-23 and
accompanying text.
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constitutional parity.
The evolution of variable freedom of the press standards was prefaced at
the turn of this century by the unsettling effects of advancing media technology
and capability. Louis Brandeis, for example, expressed concern that the print
media, with its evolving photojournalistic capacity, was becoming increasingly
intrusive and indelicate.8 Brandeis observed that the press, by trading in gossip
and effrontery, was displacing matters of genuine public interest and overstepping its bounds. 9 Although acknowledging that motion pictures were an "increasingly important [medium] ... for spreading ... knowledge and.., molding

...public opinion," 1 0 the Court initially characterized them as a "business" and
"spectacle" rather than part of the press, and expressed worry about their
"capab[ility] for evil."' 1 The consequences of these depictions persisted until
2
the midpoint of the century.'
The response to media not in existence at the time of the first amendment's
drafting has generated constitutional jurisprudence that is more convoluted than
coherent. Diminished protection has been afforded some media merely because
they are structurally different from, even if functionally similar to, other media. 13 Although the framers did not specifically anticipate film, television, radio,
and cable, diverse media existed when freedom of the press was adopted as a
constitutional principle.14 Despite the first amendment's composition in generic
rather than media-specific terms, the Court nonetheless has charted variable
rather than uniform standards.' 5
Until its recent abolition, the fairness doctrine represented an especially intrusive form of media-specific content regulation.' 6 Fairness responsibilities
17
were tied to the premise that broadcasting was a uniquely scarce medium.
After half a century of consistently, if not dogmatically, endorsing the concept
of fairness, the FCC concluded in 1987 that the scarcity premise was obsolete.18
The Commission, in abandoning the fairness principle, 19 concluded that content
20
diversity would be better promoted by an unregulated marketplace of ideas.
7. See Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 2706, 2706-07 n.16 (1987).
8. See Brandeis.& Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 196 (1890).

9. See id.
10. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 237 (1915).
11. See id. at 244.
12. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952) (the exhibition of motion
pictures to entertain and for profit does not deprive them of first amendment status).
13. See, eg., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
14. Pamphlets, posters, books, leaflets, and newspapers were variants but nonetheless elements
of the press in 1791. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974).
15. Perceived differences among media have engendered for "[e]ach method of communicating
a 'law' unto itself." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (quoting
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
16. See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
17. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969).
18. See Inquiry into § 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the
General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 58 R.R.2d 1137 (1985) [hereinafter
Fairness Report of 1985].
19. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 5043 (1987).
20. See id. at 5055-57; Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
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The FCC noted that the roles of the electronic and print media and the reasons

for protecting against governmental interference were identical. 2 1 It also asserted that constitutional analysis should focus on functional similarities rather
than physical differences. 22 Pursuant to that formulation, the Commission purported to afford broadcasters the same first amendment guarantees as print
23
journalists.
Abandonment of the fairness doctrine, however, has not elevated the broadcast media to constitutional parity with the print media. The demise of the scarcity rationale has been accompanied by the rise of new predicates for content
control. In justifying regulation of broadcast expression characterized as offensive or indecent, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the medium
has a pervasive and intrusive nature, encroaches on personal privacy, and is
uniquely accessible to children. 24 As the scarcity premise has unraveled, those
new regulatory rationales have assumed increasing prominence. Even as the
FCC purported to equalize the first amendment status of broadcasters and publishers, it perpetuated a double standard by finding that some expression,
25
although "fit to print," is too indecent for the airwaves.
If the first amendment rights of broadcasters and publishers are to be identical, abrogation of the fairness doctrine merely represents a step toward that
objective rather than an effectuation of it. Unlike publishers, broadcasters remain governed by a panoply of rules that not only control content but condition
the opportunity to broadcast upon citizenship, 26 personal integrity, 27 and ownership of other media. 28 Customized and recently reinforced controls on purConcerning Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine of Broadcast Licensees, 2 F.C.C. Rec.
5272, 5293-94 (1987) [hereinafter Fairness Alternatives].
21. "The First Amendment was adopted to protect the people not from journalists, but from
government." Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rec. at 5057.
22. See id. at 5055.
23. See id. at 5055-57.
24. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
25. The FCC has expanded its enforcement of indecency regulation to cover references to sexual or excretory functions and activities or deliberate and repetitive use of expletives when a reasonable risk exists that children are in the audience. See New Indecency Enforcement Standards To Be
Applied To All Broadcast and Amateur Radio Licensees, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 2726 (1987). Such regulation covers so-called "shock radio," which is characterized by humor laden with sexual innuendo.
See Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 2 F.C.C. Rec. 2706 (1987). Although found offensive by contemporary community standards, shock radio nonetheless has attracted substantial audiences.
26. Communications Act of 1934 § 310, 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1982).
27. Policy Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, 102 F.C.C.2d 1179
(1986).
28. Multiple ownership rules forbid a single entity from owning more than one station of the
same type in the same market. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1986). It is possible to own stations providing
different services in a single market. Although the licensee of an AM station may not hold another
AM station in the same market, for instance, he may own an FM, VHF, or UHF station. Common
ownership of a broadcast station and cable television system in the same market is prohibited. See
id. § 73.501. Moreover, a single entity may own no more than 12 AM, 12 FM, and 12 television
stations regardless of their locale. See id. § 73.3555(d). Finally, newspaper-broadcasting combinations are prohibited except for a few grandfathered by the rule. See Amendment of Sections 73.34,
73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard FM, and
Television Broadcast Stations, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975), aff'd, FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
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portedly indecent or offensive broadcasting2 9 further reflect how freedom of the
press analysis continues to proceed on separate tracks. Such media-specific
thinking, however, fails to apprehend the relationship and interaction of broadcasting with other media and the availability of marketplace checks and balances. Consequently, such reasoning continues to breed more constitutional
treachery than security.
The purpose of this Article is to assess persisting jurisprudential wisdom
necessitating individualized rather than collective assessment of the media. The
Article proposes an analytical departure point that focuses more on similarities
and less on differences among media. Finally, the Article explains why uniform
strict scrutiny of official intrusion on editorial freedom, regardless of medium, is
essential to safeguard a system of autonomous rather than authoritative
selection.
I.

DIFFERENT MEDIA, DIFFERENT STANDARDS

Established first amendment analysis requires the formulation of customized constitutional standards in response to the emergence of any new medium.
Developing communications methodologies first may be evaluated to determine
whether they are even part of the press.3 0 Motion pictures, for example, were
excluded from the first amendment's purview for nearly forty years after the
Court originally denied them press status.31
Eventually, in United States v. ParamountPictures,Inc.,32 the Court concluded there was "no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are
included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment. 33
A few years later, the Court formally rejected its original finding and held that
film was a constitutionally protected part of the press. 34 Despite retracting its
original disparagement of film and conferring constitutional status upon it, the
Court concluded that first amendment recognition was not an analytical
endpoint.3 5 Rather, the Court observed that because "each [medium] tends to
present its own peculiar problems," constitutional rules should be variable
36

rather than uniform.

The Supreme Court, in calibrating the first amendment standards for other
new media, likewise has focused on structural differences rather than functional
similarities. Identification of unique attributes thus has represented the analytical departure point in the Court's formulation of constitutional principles gov29. See supra note 25.
30. See, eg., Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus'l Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915) (motion
pictures originally adjudged to be business and spectacle rather than press), overruled on other
grounds by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
31. Id.
32. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
33. Id. at 166.
34. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
35. See id.
36. See id.at 503.
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eming radio, television, cable, and other modem media. 37 Because the
orientation regards the possibility of "abuses and dangers" 38 inimically rather

than as risks assumed by a system of freedom of expression, the construction of
standards is predisposed toward official rather than marketplace regulation.

Media-specific analysis is responsible for an increasingly permeable first
amendment. When the freedom of the press clause was drafted, newspapers

were the most prominent medium. 39 Although publishing still is the most protected communications methodology, broadcasting has displaced it as the domi-

nant mass medium. 40 Radio and television, however, are the least protected

components of the press. 41 In a real sense, therefore, media-specific analysis has
resulted in a shrinkage of the first amendment's protective mantle.
First amendment standards for radio and television evolved largely from
the determination that the broadcasting spectrum was a uniquely scarce resource. 42 The scarcity rationale begat a licensing scheme to ensure orderly use
of frequencies 43 and a consequent concern that the public might not be exposed

to diverse information and views. 4 4 The FCC thus formulated the fairness doc45
trine, and the Supreme Court, in Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC,

endorsed it.46 Essentially, the fairness principle required broadcasters to air
controversial issues and ensure that coverage of them was balanced. 47 During

its existence, the fairness doctrine was subject to persistent criticism to the effect
that it disserved both constitutional interests and regulatory goals. 48 In recently

abandoning it, the FCC conceded that the fairness doctrine had deterred rather
than promoted diversity4 9 and had constituted an intolerable invasion of edito37. See also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (billboards); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (broadcasting); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v.
FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (cable), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986).
38. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 501 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
39. See E. EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA, AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE MASS
MEDIA 68 (1972).
40. Nearly 100% of the nation's households have at least one radio and television, with most
possessing multiples of both. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States No. 906 at 531 (107th ed. 1987) [hereinafter Statistical Abstract].
41. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
42. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969).
43. The Radio Act of 1927 was enacted to provide "fair, efficient and equitable radio service."
Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-169, § 9, 44 Stat. 1162, 1166 (1927) (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 119 (1982)). Prior to its enactment, "confusion and chaos" resulted because broadcasters
used any frequency they wanted without regard to interference with competitors. See H.R. Doe. No.
481, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1926); see also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 212-13 (1943) (regulation of radio was vital to its development).
44. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1943).
45. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
46. See id. at 388-90.
47. See The Handling of Public Issues under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest
Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
48. See, eg., Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the TelecommunicationsPress, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213;
Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REV. 207 (1982);
see also CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe
Fairness Doctrine, standing alone, is insufficient... to provide the kind of uninibited... exchange
of views to which the public is constitutionally entitled.").
49. See Fairness Report of 1985, supra note 18, at 1151-74.
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rial discretion. 50
Although the fairness doctrine no longer operates,51 the media-specific
thinking that engendered it endures as a predicate for regulation that would be
constitutionally unacceptable if directed at the print media.5 2 Even when officially subscribed to as a basis for fairness regulation, scarcity was a shared characteristic rather than a differentiating feature.5 3 Daily newspapers at the time
were, and continue to be, more scarce than radio and television stations.54 If the
scarcity problem is regarded in allocational rather than numerical terms, 55 barriers to entering broadcasting or publishing remain primarily economic. 5 6 Even
cable television, which is characterized by abundant channel space, is beset by a
scarcity problem.5 7 Adequate capitalization in any circumstance is the primary
factor excluding the vast majority of the citizenry from even considering publishing, broadcasting or cablecasting. Scarcity's presence as a common characteristic of modern media betrayed the irrationality of its selective employment.5 8
Reliance on what was a "universal fact as a distinguishing principle necessarily
'5 9
[bred] analytical confusion."
Having recognized the deficiency of the fairness doctrine's premise and the
resulting constitutional difficulties, the FCC abandoned it. 6° In so doing, the
Commission noted "that full first amendment protections against content regulation should apply equally to the electronic and the printed press." 6 1 This
broad statement of principle, however, is much less than it appears to be. The
gap between official articulation and reality was vividly demonstrated by the
virtually simultaneous pronouncement of fairness deregulation and fortified control of indecent and offensive expression. 62
50. See Fairness Alternatives, supra note 20.
51. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 5043 (1987).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 95-98.

53. In 1970, a year after the Court endorsed the fairness doctrine and underlying scarcity rationale, only 1,748 daily newspapers existed. See Statistical Abstract, supra note 40, no. 920, at 536,
During the same year, 862 television stations and 6,519 radio stations operated. See id., no. 906, at
531.
54. In 1985 a total of 1,676 daily newspapers, as opposed to 9,775 radio and television stations,
were in operation. See id., no. 906, at 531, no. 920, at 536.
55. Allocational scarcity refers to the notion that only a finite number of broadcasting frequencies are available, whereas the opportunity to enter publishing theoretically is unlimited.
56. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 211, 250-52 (1974). Because a license may be transferred, a central obstacle to publishing or broadcasting is the cost of entering,
establishing, or doing business. See id. at 251.
57. To the extent cable systems constitute natural monopolies, and editorial decision making is
the responsibility of a single entity, some courts have found a scarcity problem in cable as significant
as that in broadcasting. See, eg., Omega Satellite Products Co., Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 694
F.2d 119, 127-28 (7th Cir. 1982); Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 985-86
(D.RI. 1983), vacated, 773 F.2d 382 (Ist Cir. 1985) (franchise awarded to another cable company,
making this action moot). But see Quincy Cable Television, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1450 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (standard of review reserved for occupants of physically scarce airways inapplicable to
cable because of unlimited channel capacity), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
58. See Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987).
59. Id.
60. See Fairness Report of 1985, supra note 18, at 1196-98.
61. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 5043 (1987).
62. See supra note 25 and infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
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Even before its official demise, the scarcity premise had been overshadowed
by emerging concerns about children's access to broadcasting, privacy interests
implicated by electronic transmissions into the home, and the pervasive nature
of the medium. 63 As newly identified unique characteristics of broadcasting,
they have been relied on to justify stricter content controls and to perpetuate a
constitutional double standard. 64 However, just as scarcity is a universal characteristic of the press, 65 all media have indecent or offensive capabilities. Regulation on such grounds is troublesome especially because indecency and
offensiveness are malleable concepts and are susceptible to subjective evaluation. 66 Official denomination of "one man's lyric" as vulgarity 67 not only may

beget devaluation and impedence of expression-even if political in nature68 and

69
thus otherwise officially regarded as70 the most exalted speech variant -but it
imperialism.
may facilitate cultural
Consistent with the diminished first amendment status of radio and television, the Court does not employ strict scrutiny in reviewing broadcasting regulation.7 1 Nor does the level of scrutiny vary depending on whether regulation
endeavors to promote or patently impair content diversity. 72 Thus, regulatory
interests need not be compelling to prevail, provided they are perceived as sim73
ply outweighing the importance of expressive freedom in a given instance. This

level of review has allowed constitutional interests to be offset by rationales that
may be speculative or otherwise insufficient. The concern that children have
ready access or are peculiarly vulnerable to the influence of radio and television
74
never has been translated into conclusive findings of adverse effects. Even if a
linkage existed, it is not apparent why such a determination necessarily should
63. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
64. The satirical monologue, which the Court found indecent, was reproduced in its entirety in
the appendix to the Court's opinion. See id. at 751-55.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 53-59.
66. See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 772 n.6, 775-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
68. The Court itself acknowledged that the expression at issue in Pacifica was a social satire.
PacificaFound., 438 U.S. at 746 n.22. The susceptibility of expression to control, pursuant to subjective taste regarding how the message is presented, was evinced by the narrow one vote margin enabling the bearer of the message "Fuck the Draft" to escape conviction. See Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
69. The Court traditionally regarded political expression as the most protected form of speech.
See, eg., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 561-63 (1980).
70. See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 776-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. Although judicial review of official burdens on fundamental constitutional guarantees normally demands a compelling justification, regulation of broadcasting may be subject to scrutiny that
is less probing and insistent on sensitive controls. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S.
364, 375-80 (1984).
72. Fairness regulation, even if unsuccessful, has endeavored to promote diversity, while controls on indecent or offensive expression manifestly have curtailed it. Equal protection analysis, in
contrast, sets less exacting standards for government action that promotes rather than directly and
purposely impairs equal protection rules. See, eg., Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
73. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 375-80 (1984).
74. See, eg., Videoculture, Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 25, 1985, at 25.
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make a constitutional difference. 75 Access and exposure concerns are relative
and lend themselves toward fashioning infinitely variable standards for different
types of media. Insofar as such concepts dominate, constitutional standards become structured in response to the least mature elements of the citizenry. Parental governance, which was the primary control on at least one generation's
exposure to comic books and adult literature, is itself a constitutionally recognized interest 76 and affords a more sensitive response under the first amendment
than official content control.
Privacy concerns, although offically adverted to in support of content regulation, 77 actually would seem to cut in an opposition fashion. Privacy, as a constitutionally protected interest, embraces personal autonomy.7 8 A system of
freedom of expression, favoring autonomous over authoritative selection, 79
would appear to strengthen a preference for personal rather than official control.
Worries associated with a medium's pervasiveness, however, may betray underlying visceral concerns that "it is the immediacy and power of broadcasting that
[warrant] different treatment. '' s° If so, the consequent regulatory response deviates from the principle that expression should not be penalized merely because
of its force. 81 Less exacting scrutiny that does not demand compelling justification for content control, however, may countenance such disreputable
consequences.
Standards for fairness regulation in broadcasting originally were constructed, at least in principle, to enhance content diversity. The scarcity premise, which was the underpinning for official efforts to promote first amendment
values, has been superseded by rationales that overtly impair expressive pluralism. Although in rhetoric it may have elevated the first amendment status of
broadcasters, therefore, the FCC by its actions has reinforced their diminished
constitutional standing.
75. Some parents may want their children to be exposed to expression that others find offensive.

FCC v. Paciflica Found., 438 U.S. at 770 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. See, eg., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (parental authority in the
"household to direct the rearing of... children is basic in the structure of our society"); Pierce v.
Soe'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (parents have liberty to direct upbringing and education of
their children). See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (parental discretion
regarding a child's education has "a high place in our society").
77. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.

78. See, eg., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1973) (right of privacy protects autonomy

in making fundamental personal decisions); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969) (privacy

concerns in the sense of personal choice are even more profound to the extent they implicate receipt
of information in sanctity of home).
79. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326
U.S. 1 (1945).

80. Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
81. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-91 (1978) (personal power and
influence do not affect setting of first amendment standards); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49
(1976) (restricting the speech of some to enhance the relative voice of others is alien to the first

amendment); Telecommunications Research, 801 F.2d at 508 (effectiveness of speech is not a justification for according it less first amendment protection).
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II. THE FUNCTIONAL SIMILARITIES OF THE PRESS: CONSTRUCTING A
COMMON FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARD
Identification of features that may be unique to a given medium is not a

taxing exercise. Different media possess manifestly distinct structural characteristics. The printed word, for example, generally affords depth and detail, allows
the reader to set his rate of exposure to information, and affords immediate opportunity for review and retrieval. Electronic media and motion pictures, because of their graphic nature and multisensory reach, project images or words
that may either create lasting impressions or escape perception because they
flash by too quickly or are not absorbed by an inattentive mind. Research has
yielded mixed results on the issue of whether broadcasting promotes antisocial
behavior.8 2 Exposure to radio and television may facilitate a child's capacity for
parallel processing of information.8 3 Because access to broadcasting does not
84
have a literacy prerequisite, moreover, it arguably is more democratic.
Even within the electronic media, differences beyond the obvious structural
ones may readily be discerned. Profit maximization strategies of broadcasting
and cablecasting, for instance, facilitate divergent programming tactics and resuits. Because television profits are tied to a single mass audience, programming
is calculated to attract the most viewers and offend the least.8 5 The consequence
is relatively unadventurous, middle-of-the-road programming.8 6 A cable system's multichannel capacity is directed toward fragmented audiences and
87
thereby is structurally disposed toward offering more diverse programming.
Even though differences among media exist, reliance on these differences for
constitutional variances is problematical. Such a focus may breed procrustean
results or disregard significant exceptions that undercut a general rule's viability.
The scarcity principle, for example, actually may afford more persuasive support
for regulating publishing than broadcasting.8 8 Moreover, even if a medium such
as newspapers or cable television may be better structured for maximizing content diversity, actual performance may fall short of potential. Thus, media-specific analysis may suffer from generalizing too little and too much.
The practical futility of fashioning constitutional distinctions among communications methodologies, moreover, is suggested by the overlapping if not
merging capabilities of modern media. Cable is a hybrid medium that has defied
easy depiction under present analytical standards. Courts, charged with the responsibility of identifying unique characteristics, have disagreed on whether it is
more akin to broadcasting than publishing.8 9 Cable can electronically
82. See Videoculture, Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 25, 1985, at 25.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bazelon, supra note 48, at 230.
86. See Bazelon, supra note 48, at 230.
87. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700-01 (1984); Quincy Cable TV, Inc.,
768 F.2d 1434, 1438-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
88. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 57.
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reproduce a publication for home viewing and retransmit a radio or television
signal. Given such combinant attributes, different standards for electronic and
printed newspapers would be artificial and contrived.
Although it is easy to identify differences among media, it is more difficult
to explain satisfactorily why such distinctions should be drawn. Moreover, the
search for distinguishing characteristics risks being reflexive and self-perpetuating rather than rationally motivated. The scarcity rationale was not merely
abandoned when finally determined to be obsolete, for instance, but was supplanted by newly identified concerns.
The justification for disparate first amendment formulas is especially problematical because media have the overarching functional similarity of disseminating information. Structural methodology or public preferences for a
particular medium should have little relevance toward the fashioning of first
amendment protection. 90 Nonetheless, the obligation to search for constitutionally distinguishing traits has fostered an analytical process that is hypersensitive
to perceived imperfections 91 and, contrary to normative first amendment expec92
tations, disposed toward official intercession.
A focus on unique characteristics and the consequent operation of official
rather than marketplace controls not only slights the notion of autonomous selection, but discounts the significance of media interaction and competition.
Even if a particular medium does not provide fair coverage, for example, most
individuals are exposed to multiple sources of information that compete and
balance one another. The effect of undesired exposure to indecent or offensive
expression also can be diluted or even offset to the extent media compete with or
augment one another.9 3 The public's receipt of information from diverse
sources and the citizenry's pluralistic nature and interests suggest the need for
caution in considering government regulation that respectively would overlook
and disregard those realities. Because media function in a conjunctive rather
than disjunctive fashion, the general marketplace affords diversity and remedies
for abuses or excesses, even if a particular medium may not. The quality of first
amendment results thus would be enhanced to the extent analysis was calibrated
toward the media collectively rather than specifically.
90. In abandoning the fairness doctrine, the FCC purported to favor an analytical focus on
functional similarities rather than structural differences among media and consequent elevation of
new media to the constitutional level of old media. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 5043,
5557 (1987). Despite that articulation, and as discussed supra notes 24-29 and infra notes 95-98 and
accompanying text, however, disparate regulatory approaches persist.
91. Focusing on distinctive characteristics might be more tolerable to the extent it was a prelude to diversity enhancement rather than restrictive schemes. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,
768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). Even then, however, the
danger of misguided efforts to promote expressive pluralism, such as the fairness doctrine, would
persist.
92. See Lively, Fearand the Media: A FirstAmendment HorrorShow, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1071,
1093 (1985). See generally Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1448 (distinguishing cable television from
ordinary broadcast television for first amendment purposes).

93. Insofar as concerns relate to a medium's accessibity to children, competing or augmenting
sources of information may include parental input. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
FROM PARTIAL TO COMPREHENSIVE CONTENT DEREGULATION

The purported elevation of broadcasters to the same first amendment status
as publishers constitutes rhetoric that surpasses reality. Abandonment of the
fairness doctrine has not been accompanied by a rejection of media-specific analysis. So long as this thinking is subscribed to, it will engender constitutional
variances and delimit the first amendment's reach. The FCC has declared that
broadcasters should have the same first amendment status as publishers, and the
public rather than government should determine what expression is fit for consumption.94 It finds no inconsistency, however, between its market-oriented
rhetoric and simultaneous fortification of controls on indecent or offensive expression. 95 The consequent disparity in first amendment law, however, is manifest. Despite the FCC's assertion that indecency controls merely constitute
reasonable "time channeling" akin to "place channeling" effectuated by the zoning of adult bookstores and movie theatres, 96 the analogy is more a product of
convenience than principle. Zoning restrictions on adult expression are less
comprehensive than curbs upon indecent broadcasting. The George Carlin
monologue in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, although subject to time channeling,
is not place channeled but instead is freely available in print including in the
appendix to the court's opinion. 97 Elevation of broadcasting to the same constitutional status as publishing requires more than a rejection of obsolete regulatory premises. Parity cannot be realized until the persisting conflict between
first amendment interests and officially perceived public interest is reconciled.
In Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC,the Supreme Court determined that
the right of viewers and listeners to receive diverse viewpoints superseded that of
broadcasters to exercise full editorial autonomy. 98 Official content control impairs that paramount public right, however, as the FCC finally recognized in its
abandonment of the fairness doctrine. 99 Comprehensive relaxation of content
controls would further promote editorial and public interests. Consistent emphasis on the first amendment's basic function as a preclusion against, rather
than a justification for governmental interference would create a less hospitable
climate for antipluralistic mechanisms. The public's interest in receiving diverse
information and self-selection are advanced insofar as the flow of information is
less filtered.
The first amendment interests of the press and the public can and should be
regarded as complementary rather than competitive. Comprehensive protection
rather than selective purification of expression may facilitate offensive and inde94. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
95. See Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pa., 2 F.C.C. Rec., 2706-07 n.16 (1987).
96. See New Indecency Enforcement Standards to Be Applied To All Broadcast and Amateur
Licensees, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 2726 (1987). The Court has determined that indecent or offensive expression, such as adult books or movies, may not be prohibited but is subject to location controls. See,
eg., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).

97. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751-55 (1978). Unrestricted availability in other

media actually is critical to the special susceptibility to regulation in broadcast form. See id. at 760
(Powell, J., concurring).

98. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
99. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 5043, 5055-57 (1987).
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cent expression. Instead of being worrisome to the point of triggering a regulatory response, however, such a consequence should serve as a reminder that the
first amendment not only creates opportunities but assigns responsibilities. The
first amendment, in theory, trusts the public to make sound decisions and assumes the risk that it will not. 10 A system of official control designed to curb
expression that may offend or affront has the potential for reaching views that
merely are unpopular or unorthodox. 10 1 The transfer of responsibility for content evaluation thus has more profoundly subversive potential than any harmful
tendencies of indecent or offensive expression.
In a constitutional value system that supposedly favors pluralism and autonomous over authoritative selection, 10 2 adverse consequences of expression
may be addressed or remedied by preemptive or reactive personal action. Official catering to the tastes of some to dictate what information is available to
others represents inverted thinking. Individuals wanting to see or hear what
may not be broadcast, it is true, have alternative means of obtaining access to
such material.10 3 The burden and cost of practical private regulation that would
effectively screen out unwanted expression, however, would be incurred only
once and consequently be less imposing than the tariff on multiple diversitymotivated purchases. 104 Despite the disparity of costs, which seem to favor first
amendment concerns, the Court essentially has favored the taxing of pluralism
rather than intolerance.10 5 Especially to the extent that private governance
readily and effectively may be exercised, self-help is preferable to official controls
that promote majoritarian or subjective interests at the expense of constitutional
values.
Comprehensive rather than partial deregulation of the information marketplace must be preceded by a recognition that, despite their structural differences,
media are functionally similar. That realization would translate into the assessment of all media pursuant to a like standard of review. Instead of being evaluated pursuant to a less searching standard of review enabling the Court to
engage in routine balancing of competing interests,10 6 broadcast regulation
should beget the exacting scrutiny employed when more established first amendment interests are burdened.107 Identical first amendment standards of review
would not necessarily ensure identical results. Licensing, generally an intolerable form of prior restraint,10 8 still might be justified in the electronic forum as a
100. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 (1978) (first amendment contemplates the danger that people will act unwisely). See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
24-25 (1971) ("free expression is powerful medicine in a [pluralistic] society" that disfavors official

restraint in the hope that citizenry will render informed judgments).

101. See id. at 26.
102. Id. at 24.
103. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 760 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
104. Lock boxes and channel blockers are commercially available devices that, for minimal cost,
enable parents to control television consumption.
105. See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 774-75 (Brennan, ., dissenting).
106. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
107. See, eg., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
108. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
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necessary means for ensuring orderly use of frequencies. 10 9 The media-specific
survival of the licensing process would owe its continued use not to a fixed
double standard, however, but to a demonstration of a compelling interest.
Stricter scrutiny not only would require a reevaluation of controls on indecent or offensive broadcasting but may necessitate a wholesale reassessment of
radio and television regulation. Limited resources, for instance, normally are
not a constitutionally permissible basis for excluding aliens from other opportunities available to citizens.110 Moreover, alienage restraints represent an official
preference that may impede genuine diversity maximization, and thus interfere
not only with equal protection but first amendment interests.
Conditioning of a broadcasting license on personal character likewise would
require a compelling justification. If a crook may publish but not broadcast, the
implication is that the danger to the public interest is more acute in the latter
setting. Concern with relative influence, however, is contrary to normative first
amendment expectations.1i Even if broadcasting remains governed by a public
interest standard, good character does not necessarily translate into admirable
service.
Restrictions on a person's or entity's media holdings 1 2 presume that diverse ownership will promote expressive pluralism.11 3 Such a premise may be
valid, but it never has been tested by searching judicial inquiry.1 14 The Court
already has determined that a heavily concentrated newspaper industry does not
justify first amendment encroachment. 1 5 Arguably, the resources associated
with large and concentrated ownership may afford higher quality radio and television programming than is provided by less capitalized ownership.1 1 6 Size, corporate diversification, and absentee ownership also may afford more resistance
to pressures from local vested powers and interests. Such possibilities, that
would have been assessed in the event of comparably direct constraints on publishing, remain unexamined for broadcasting.
Closer scrutiny of broadcasting regulation would assign to government the
burden of proving the need for such control. 1 17 It thus would be necessary to
demonstrate convincingly that alternatives less burdensome to first amendment
interests, including private remedies, were inadequate. Even if some disparate
109. Licensing of broadcasters was adopted as a means for creating order out of the confusion
and chaos that existed when frequencies were utilized pursuant to private whim. See National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1943).
110. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 379 (1971) (state's interest in preserving limited
welfare benefits does not justify excluding noncitizens from eligibility).
111. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978).
112. See supra note 28 (discussing multiple ownership rules).
113. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978).
114. See id. at 803.
115. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
116. See Combined Communications Corp., 72 F.C.C.2d 637, 685 (1979) (financial health of
media chain may encourage initiative and risk-taking in news reporting, diminish concern for sponsor reaction, facilitate challenges to local parochial views, and provide a major media source to
compete with national news media).
117. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 375-80 (1984).
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results might persist, therefore, the citizenry's interest in selecting what it
watches and hears, as well as what it reads, would be enhanced.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has observed that "'dissemination of news from as
many different sources, and with as many different facets and colors as ...
possible,'" is a first amendment ideal. 118 It thus has noted that "'right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues'" than
through official screening.1 9 By engendering standards that allow official judgment to supplant self-determination, however, media-specific analysis has
strayed from these fundamental notions. Offensiveness and indecency are
among the "different facets and colors" that constitute expressive pluralism. Diminished regard for such speech, pursuant to the notion that it can be sensitively
identified, has treacherous potential. A system of freedom of expression would
be better served if analysis focused less on perceived characteristics of speech
and the structural nature of the media and instead uniformly demanded compelling reasons for official intervention.

118. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 602-03 (1953) (quoting
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
119. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd 326 U.S. 1 (1945))..

